The Political Economy of New Authoritarianism in Southeast Asia by Einzenberger, Rainer & Schaffar, Wolfram
www.ssoar.info
The Political Economy of New Authoritarianism in
Southeast Asia
Einzenberger, Rainer; Schaffar, Wolfram
Veröffentlichungsversion / Published Version
Zeitschriftenartikel / journal article
Empfohlene Zitierung / Suggested Citation:
Einzenberger, R., & Schaffar, W. (2018). The Political Economy of New Authoritarianism in Southeast Asia. ASEAS -
Austrian Journal of South-East Asian Studies, 11(1), 1-12. https://doi.org/10.14764/10.ASEAS-2018.1-1
Nutzungsbedingungen:
Dieser Text wird unter einer CC BY-NC-ND Lizenz
(Namensnennung-Nicht-kommerziell-Keine Bearbeitung) zur
Verfügung gestellt. Nähere Auskünfte zu den CC-Lizenzen finden
Sie hier:
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/deed.de
Terms of use:
This document is made available under a CC BY-NC-ND Licence
(Attribution-Non Comercial-NoDerivatives). For more Information
see:
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0
ASEAS 11(1) | 1
The Political Economy of New Authoritarianism    
in Southeast Asia
Rainer Einzenberger & Wolfram Schaffar
► Einzenberger, R., & Schaffar, W. (2018). The political economy of new authoritarianism in Southeast 
Asia. Austrian Journal of South-East Asian Studies, 11(1), 1-12.
INTRODUCTION
Over the past years, the deterioration of democracy and the rise of authoritar-
ian forms of governance have been a growing global phenomenon. In the Global 
North, this became painfully clear not least since the establishment of right-wing 
governments in Hungary and Poland, or the election victory of Donald Trump in 
November 2016. Southeast Asia is certainly no exception to this trend (Chacko 
& Jayasuriya, 2018; Docena, 2018; Kurlantzick, 2014). With General Prayuth 
Chan-o-cha in Thailand (2014) and Rodrigo Duterte in the Philippines (2016), 
two more ‘strongmen’ joined the ranks of authoritarian leaders in a region that is 
departing fast from democratic pathways. They follow a law and order attitude 
reflected in statements such as that of General Prayuth who warned of “obses-
sion with rights” which could “lead to anarchy” (“Obsession With rights”, 2017). 
Duterte's central message is that the Philippines suffer from elites who care too 
much about Western notions of human rights and Western democracy (Bello, 
this volume; Focus on the Global South, 2017; Juego, 2017). Several recent sur-
veys confirm the authoritarian trend in Southeast Asia. The Democracy Index 
2017, for example, listed six out of ten nations of the Association of Southeast 
Asian Nations (ASEAN) (Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar, Singapore, Thailand, and 
Vietnam) as unfree, two (Indonesia and Malaysia) as largely free and only Timor-
Leste as partly free (Brunei not included). None of the countries was considered 
as fully free (The Economist Intelligence Unit, 2018). 
Meanwhile, research on new authoritarianism has emerged as a dynamic field 
in different disciplinary and regional epistemic communities. Due to the global 
scope of the issue, its political relevance and its highly contested nature, emerg-
ing debates are very vibrant, and yet fragmented. This fragmentation is mirrored, 
firstly, in the variety of concepts which are being used – the most prominent 
being authoritarianism, populism, and fascism – sometimes in combinations or 
with specifying adjectives (authoritarian populism, populist authoritarianism, 
right-wing populism, right-wing authoritarianism, authoritarian neo-liberalism, 
etc.). For this special issue, we will use new authoritarianism as an umbrella term 
– in singular, without suggesting that it denotes a single well-defined homo-
geneous concept or regime type (for a different approach see Docena, 2018). 
Secondly, the dynamism and fragmentation of the debate on new authoritarian-
ism is mirrored in the highly controversial debate about the actors and the social 
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base of the turn towards the new authoritarianism (Demirović, Sablowski, Schneider, 
& Syrovatka, 2018). Thirdly, there seem to be fundamentally differing views on how 
to conceptualize the link between authoritarianism, neoliberal capitalism, and the 
economic crisis. On the one hand, there seems to be an emerging consensus that the 
rise of a new authoritarianism is linked to what has been analyzed as a multiple crisis 
which started in 2008. Yet, it is highly controversial in how far the new authoritarian-
ism marks the ascent of a nationalist, protectionist – thus anti-neo-liberal – mode of 
regulation, or rather is connected to a further intensification and continuation of the 
neo-liberal economic policies (Bruff, 2014; Demirović, 2018).
This special issue contributes to the emerging debate and addresses different 
phenomena of new authoritarianism in the Southeast Asian region from a political 
economy perspective. We argue for the need to understand new authoritarianism as 
connected to the crisis of global neoliberal capitalism and as part of a global trend. In 
all areas of the discussion, the role of China as a new hegemonic power plays a central 
role. Against this backdrop, data from Southeast Asia – where Chinese economic, 
political, and cultural influence is particularly strong – promises new insights and 
valuable contribution to the general debate.
FROM DEMOCRATIC ‘POSTER CHILD’ TO AUTHORITARIAN ‘PROBLEM REGION’
Not long ago, in the early 2000s, hope for democratic progress in the region was 
still high (Freedom House, 2005).1 Globally, the number of democratic countries had 
increased since the 1970s in a steady process described as “the third wave of democra-
tization” (Huntington, 1991) and spread to Asia in the 1990s (Croissant, 2016). At the 
end of the cold war, Fukuyama famously declared the “end of history” and the eternal 
victory of liberal democracy over communism (Fukuyama, 1992). The extraordinary 
economic growth in the New Tiger States (Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesia, and the 
Philippines) appeared to create the conditions for democratic reforms as suggested 
by modernization theory (Lipset, 1960). With increasing income levels, an educated 
urban middle class was growing, championed as the ‘bearer of democracy’. Indeed, 
following the early years of the economic boom, mass movements dominated by 
middle class replaced the old authoritarian regimes one by one. It started with the 
overthrow of the Marcos regime in the Philippines by the People Power Revolution 
in 1992 (Thompson, 2011). In the same year in Thailand, the Mobile Mob mass pro-
tests led to the toppling of General Suchinda and the legendary intervention of King 
Bhumipol (McCargo, 1997). Subsequently, democracy in Thailand appeared to con-
solidate with the 1997 constitution. In Indonesia, the Reformasi movement overthrew 
General Suharto in the wake of the economic crisis of 1997; and in Malaysia Anwar 
Ibrahim challenged his former superior Mahathir (Funston, 2000).
However, when the ‘third wave’ reached its democratic peak in the mid-2000s, 
progress began to stall or even reverse quickly (Croissant, 2016). In Thailand, Prime 
Minister Thaksin Shinawatra, during his first term in office, had gradually turned 
into an authoritarian populist (Pasuk & Baker, 2011), cracking down on political dis-
sent, waging a bloody “war on drugs” (which Duterte would copy ten years later), and 
1 In its 2005 report, Freedom House categorizes the majority of ASEAN nations as partly free or free. 
ASEAS 11(1) | 3
Rainer Einzenberger & Wolfram Schaffar
stirring up an insurgency in Thailand’s south. Yet, after he was re-elected in 2005, the 
military staged a coup in 2006 and yet again in 2014, re-installing a military dictator-
ship that has lasted for already five years.2 In Cambodia, the iron grip of quasi-dictator 
Hun Sen destroyed any hopes for a democratic government to rise out of the ashes 
of civil war, with the support of the UN (Hutt, 2017). In Laos in 2012, the (enforced) 
disappearance of civil society leader Sombath Somphone ended any illusions of a 
political opening (Fuller, 2013). In addition, Myanmar, the most recent candidate for a 
democratic transition, has disappointed international observers. Even after the take-
over of the civilian government, led by the National League for Democracy (NLD), 
in many respects authoritarian politics did not recede, raising questions concerning 
an “authoritarian rollback” (Buschmann, 2017). In particular, the crisis around the 
violent displacement of roughly 700,000 Rohingya led to an international outcry and 
condemnation of the former democratic icon Aung San Suu Kyi for not preventing 
what has been called an “ethnic cleansing” (Beyrer & Adeeba, 2017).
Hence, at ASEANs 50th anniversary - celebrated in 2017 - the political out-
look for the region was rather bleak. Since the 2007 ASEAN Charter, a number of 
reforms have been initiated; in particular, the neoliberal reform agenda of the ASEAN 
Economic Community (AEC) (Juego, 2014). Other “principles of the Charter, how-
ever, have not been adequately implemented. That’s particularly true when it comes 
to issues concerning human rights, democracy, fundamental freedoms, good gov-
ernance, and the rule of law” (Khoo Ying Hooi, 2017, for a different perspective see 
Middleton & Pritchart, 2013). The widespread assumption that increased economic 
growth would lead to an increased level of political freedom proved wrong over the 
long run. In addition, the role of the middle-class is controversial, with the urban 
middle classes in Thailand supporting fascist-like, popular, anti-democracy move-
ments (Naruemon & McCargo, 2016; Schaffar, 2016, 2018), and middle classes in the 
Philippines approving extrajudicial killings of so called ‘drug users’ by a populist full 
of disdain for human rights (Focus on the Global South, 2017). The question remains 
how this trend of stalled or even reversed democratization can be conceived of, and 
what makes this region unique compared to global trends?
TOWARDS AN EXPLANATION OF THE RISE OF AUTHORITARIANISM
The emerging debate on new authoritarianism is dynamic as well as fragmented. This 
is true for the global discourse as well as for the debate on and in SEA. To lay the foun-
dation for our contribution, some remarks on the history and definition of central 
concepts and terms are due. What we subsume under new authoritarianism can be dis-
cussed on different conceptual levels: on the level of regimes, of actors, and of ideology.
Regimes
The term authoritarianism in the sense of a regime type was established by Linz 
(1975). Similar to the tripartite regime typology of Aristotle or the Weberian tripartite 
2 Thaksin was the first Prime Minister in the history of Thailand ever re-elected to serve a second term. 
For an analysis of the political polarization, see Naruemon (2016). 
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typology based on the criterion of legitimacy, Linz uses the criterion of pluralism and 
contrasts authoritarianism (with limited pluralism) with democracy (unlimited plu-
ralism) and totalitarianism (no pluralism/complete conformity). Authoritarianism, 
according to Linz, is a regime type where traditional institutions, like the family, 
church, or corporatist organizations, are used for the exertion of dictatorial rule. 
Whereas Linz conceptualizes authoritarianism as fundamentally different from 
democracy, critical materialist approaches see authoritarianism as an inherent fea-
ture to bourgeois democracy. Poulantzas (1978/2000) analyzed rising authoritarian 
tendencies in the democratically consolidated welfare states of the 1970s and coined 
the concept of authoritarian statism (Kannankulam, 2009, p. 223-224). On a descrip-
tive level, Poulantzas’ work shows parallels to the characterization of Linz’ typology. 
Nevertheless, he is writing from the perspective of critical state theory and analyzes 
the authoritarian tendencies as result of the economic crisis, which began with the oil 
crisis in 1973 and put Western democracies under pressure. These ideas have recently 
been taken up by Lukas Oberndorfer in his concept of authoritarian constitutionalism 
(Kannankulam, 2016; Oberndorfer, 2013) – a specific strategy of the EU to enshrine 
neoliberal policies of austerity in quasi constitutional treaties on the EU level, and 
defend them by means of increasing suppressive measures.3
Populism
Populism is one of the most frequently used categories in the current discourse on the 
rise of new authoritarianism. Roughly speaking it denotes a situation where a “rhe-
torically versed leader” appeals to or “seduces the dull populace” by means of “false 
promises” (Boos, 2018, p. 10). Because of its analytical vagueness, and the strong ten-
dency to be used as political slogan, there have been frequent appeals to abandon the 
concept.4 A second quite different strand of the debate on populism stems from Latin 
America, where leaders in the early and mid-20th century achieved a substantial 
improvement of the situation of the marginalized parts of the population through 
social reforms.5 The special feature shared by these presidents, which owed them the 
characterization as populists, was that they mobilized the electorate by emotionally 
appealing language. For Southeast Asia, the term was taken up by Mizuno and Pasuk 
(2009) and recently by Hadiz and Robison (2017), and Hewison (2017), largely draw-
ing on the structural functionalist tradition and a pejorative meaning. 
3 Very similar, but including a focus of the electoral dynamism inside the nation states, Alex Demirović 
(2018) speaks of authoritarian populism. Docena (2017) speaks of authoritarian populism in connection 
with Duterte. 
4 The current exponential use of the concept is, according to Boos (2018), more an expression of the lack 
of concepts on the side of the Left, and should be analyzed as a phenomenon of its own. Boos identifies 
two major historic sources of the concept of populism: One source is the Russian Narodniki – the move-
ment of “going to the people” of young Russian intellectuals -and the US-American People's Party in the 
late 19th century.
5 Those leaders included Lázaro Cardenas (Mexico), Getúlio Vargas (Brazil), and Juan Domingo Perón 
(Argentina).
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Fascism
Similar to authoritarianism of populism, fascism is not clearly defined and has a 
strong undertone of a political slogan. The term fascism is derived from a term for 
Italian vigilante groups – (Fasci Italiani di Combattimento or FIC) – which were sup-
ported by the capitalists in northern Italy, with the aim of fighting the increasing 
influence of organized labor and communist groups in factories and among rural 
laborers. Under Mussolini’s leadership, these vigilante groups grew strong enough to 
abolish the parliamentarian system and establish an authoritarian regime based on 
violence. Theories focusing on the dynamism of class struggle and the role of political 
violence in the early stages of the rise of fascism (Saage, 2007) have recently been used 
by Bello (2018) for a cross-regional and diachronic comparative analysis of regimes in 
Italy, Chile, Indonesia, Thailand, and the Philippines. Schaffar (2016) and Schaffar & 
Naruemon (in print) focus on vigilante actors in the social media as a form of fascist 
groups and follow a similar interpretation of the situation of present day Thailand. 
Ideology
All authoritarian regime types discussed here – authoritarianism, populism, fas-
cism – primarily denote a mode of governance. However, in the discourses center-
ing around the respective concepts we find literature that can be characterized as an 
“ideational approach”, trying to carve out a specific ideological content connected 
to the respective concepts. Mudde and Kaltwasser (2017, p. 6) define populism as a 
“thin-centered ideology that considers society to be ultimately separated into two 
homogeneous and antagonistic camps, ‘the pure people’ versus ‘the corrupt elite’ and 
which argues that politics should be an expression of the volonté générale (general 
will) of the people”. Fascism, on the other hand, is understood as a political ideology 
whose mythic core is a palingenetic (meaning the idea of ‘national rebirth’) form of 
populist ultra-nationalism (Griffin, 2003). 
Certainly, the recent developments in Southeast Asia provide an abundance of 
data which can be analyzed along these lines: Xenophobic discourses, anti-liberal 
ideas, the legitimization of the use of violence, the de-humanization of refugees, the 
anti-gender discourses, the rising LGBTIQ-phobia. In a comparative perspective, 
however, it seems that the present authoritarian regimes in Southeast Asia do not 
share a common ideology: Thailand with its hyper-monarchy, the Philippines with its 
preoccupation with drug abuse, or Indonesia with its dynamics connected to Islamic 
fundamentalism. What unites the new authoritarian leaders, and what might count 
as a distinctive feature for the entire Southeast Asian region, however, is the recur-
rence of the Asian Values debate.
Values debate
The idea of ‘Asian Values’ was popularized in the 1990s by autocrats such as Mahathir 
and Singapore’s Lee Kuan Yew (Thompson, 2001). They claimed that Asian values 
based on Confucianism – with a supposed focus on loyalty towards the family and 
community – were simply not compatible with the concept of ‘Western democracy’ 
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emphasizing individual freedom. This argument has been somewhat revived at times 
also in the context of Thailand, referring to ‘Thai Style’ democracy (Ferrara, 2010; 
Thompson, 2015; Walker, 2006). Yet, several surveys suggest that preferences for 
authoritarian politics are certainly not limited to (Southeast) Asia. Also in ‘settled’ 
Western democracies, an increased support for authoritarian populists led to the rise 
of right-wing parties for instance in Austria, Switzerland, Netherlands, Denmark, 
Hungary amongst others. Different from the Asian values debate, the tendency 
towards authoritarianism has been explained by some as a “cultural backlash in 
Western societies against long-term, ongoing social change” and increasing liberal-
ization (Norris, 2016).
Actors
After looking at regimes and ideologies, a third dimension of new authoritarianism 
needs to be considered. Who are the actors behind the new development? Who prof-
its from it? How can we analyze the social base of new authoritarian regimes?
Concerning these questions, a highly controversial debate has evolved in the United 
States and in Europe, at the example of the rise of Trump or what has been called 
authoritarian populism in Europe (Demirović, 2018; Eversberg, 2018; Lessenich, 2016; 
Sablowski & Thien, 2018). The two contradictory and seemingly irreconcilable views 
are: On the one hand – the analysis that the social base is mainly working-class peo-
ple, who are the losers of neoliberal globalization and have been abandoned by the 
social democratic parties (Demirović, 2018; Sablowski & Thien 2018).6 On the other 
hand, Lessenich (2016) and Eversberg (2018) focus on the role of middle-classes and 
their chauvinistic motivation to defend their social status. This line of argumentation 
can also be found in Southeast Asia. Saxer (2014), for instance understands the “rage 
of the middle class” in Thailand as a fight between elites during a transformation cri-
sis. In this case, conservative elites resort to fascist ideologies (Schaffar, 2016) to gain 
legitimacy, and apply extra-constitutional measures to turn back the re-distributive 
project of Thaksin’s populism. Bello (2018) too, sees a crucial and ambivalent role 
of the middle-class in the dialectic of “revolution–counterrevolution” against a per-
ceived revolutionary threat by a “progressive movement that is able to use the law and 
established institutions to promote social reform” (p. 34).7 
THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF NEW AUTHORITARIANISM 
The authors in this issue take a political economic perspective in order to understand 
the rise of authoritarian regimes in Southeast Asia as well as globally. This distin-
guishes the present special issue from analyses cited earlier, which rely on a modular 
approach to democracy (Croissant, 2016), treat the political system as largely detached 
from the surrounding economic situation, and identify authoritarianism as an 
endogenous dysfunction of the political system. The approach pursued here departs 
6 Walden Bello's (2018) analysis of the rise of Duterte mirrors this view, too.
7 Due to space limitations, we will throw only a spotlight on open questions in this field in the Research 
Workshop section of this issue (Schaffar).
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from the parallel nature of the phenomenon at this critical juncture of late capital-
ism, as there seems to be an intrinsic connection to the crisis of capitalism. Already 
decades before the financial crisis of 2008, Poulantzas (1978/2000) developed the 
concept of authoritarian statism, which seems strikingly contemporary. This concept 
explains how states try to manage economic growth under crisis tendencies result-
ing in “intensified state control over every sphere of socio-economic life combined 
with radical decline of the institutions of political democracy and with draconian 
and multiform, curtailment of so-called ‘formal’ liberties” (Poulantzas, 1978/2000, 
pp. 203-204). While the concept focused on western capitalist states, it is also applied 
to dependent states in the periphery (Chacko & Jayasuriya, 2018; Jayasuriya, 2018). 
Even though it displays certain fascist elements, according to Poulantzas authori-
tarian statism does not equal the historic form of fascism. As a result of the ‘crisis 
of crisis management', producing increasing unemployment, inequality and social 
tensions, authoritarian states increasingly resort to nationalist ideologies, sometimes 
combined with religious elements to manufacture hegemony and support for its neo-
liberal re-structuring (Demirović, 2018; Docena, 2017).
The connection between the economic crisis and the rise of authoritarianism 
seems well established. What is contested, though, is the question whether there is 
a specific kind of economic project underlying the new authoritarian regimes. One 
line of argumentation – following Poulantzas – is that new authoritarian regimes 
mean a further intensification of neoliberalism. Another position claims that the 
new regimes pursue an anti-neoliberal project – most clearly mirrored by the new 
mercantilist ‘XY first’ economic policies – and in non-Western countries a move to 
abandon western style neo-liberal globalization.
This is where the role of China comes into play. China itself has undergone a mas-
sive capitalist transformation over the past decades, arguably rescuing global capitalism 
from the crisis of Fordism following the 1970s (Harvey, 2005; Neuwirth, 2018). Yet as 
China’s own capital accumulation cycle is experiencing a decline, it set out to plan a 
massive infrastructure investment program abroad as a way of “spatial fix” to its over-
accumulation problems (Harvey, 2001; Zhang, 2017). Following its ‘going out’ strategy 
at the turn of the millennium, China soon became the largest investor in the Southeast 
Asia Region. In 2013, it announced its massive One Belt One Road Initiative (OBOR), 
also known as Belt-and-Road Initiative (BRI). With an investment volume of several 
trillion USD, supported by the BRICS Bank and the Asian Infrastructure Investment 
Bank (AIIB) (Chen & Mardeusz, 2015), the plan involves massive infrastructure devel-
opment (including harbors, ports, highways, railways, etc.). Eventually, it should cover 
over 60% of the world population, potentially overshadowing the US Marshall Plan. 
The strategy is to export capital and labor and integrate as many countries as pos-
sible into its economic and political sphere, thus replacing the Washington Consensus 
with the Beijing Consensus and diminishing US strategic influence in the region. While 
US imperialism has used free trade agreements and (forced) market liberalization as a 
means to extend its political influence (Harvey, 2001), China is building connections 
through infrastructure development. Thereby a heavy debt creates a dependence or 
debt bondage which some have called “creditor imperialism” (Chellaney, 2017).
According to Kneuer and Demmelhuber (2016), China can be regarded as one of 
the world's new “authoritarian gravity centers” which may serve as a role model “for 
8 | ASEAS 11(1)
The Political Economy of New Authoritarianism in Southeast Asia
the countries in their geopolitical proximity, making emulation, learning processes 
or policy transfers effective means of autocracy promotion” (p. 777). While China 
may not actively promote authoritarian regimes, it is at least providing indirect sup-
port through its economic engagement with authoritarian regimes. This might also 
result from China’s quest for stability in the countries, which are the destination 
of large-scale investment. The political consequences can be observed for instance 
in Cambodia where longtime prime minister Hun Sen, relying on China’s full sup-
port, openly repudiated Cambodia’s former Western sponsors by dissolving the main 
opposition party and closing down an independent US-American-owned newspaper 
(Hutt, 2017).
In his case study, Einzenberger (this issue) discusses the politics of dispossession 
around a planned Chinese mining project in Myanmar’s frontier at the beginning of 
the political transition in 2011. The study constitutes a showcase of the influence of 
China – mediated through Chinese companies and investment – on political pro-
cesses in the neighboring countries, resulting in (de-)democratization processes and 
counter-movements. Myanmar is well known for its dependence on China, which 
enabled the authoritarian military regime’s survival, also in times of international 
sanctions. Rich in resources and sharing a long border, the country is considered by 
China as a resource frontier to be integrated into its economic orbit in order to fuel 
its economic growth. Due to the regime of dispossession described in the article as 
frontier capitalism, in the early years of the political transition there was a consider-
able increase of anti-dispossession movements. While reconciliation with the US and 
Europe opened up some political space for civil society to contest dispossession, in 
recent years, Myanmar has re-oriented itself again towards China, in particular due 
to its worsening diplomatic ties with Europe and the US in relation to the ‘Rohingya 
crisis’. Interestingly, while the Rohingya have been scapegoated as an economic and 
political threat, millions of Chinese immigrants in the countries’ north, de-facto 
dominating the economy, have been left out of the public discourse.
Looking at the case of Thailand, Schaffar in his article discusses another example 
of how de-democratization processes can be linked to the impact of Chinese projects. 
His approach, however, focuses on a macro-level and on different actors at a national 
level. He argues, that the high-speed railway project proposed in 2013 – connecting 
Thailand via Laos to China as part of Chinas Belt-and-Road Initiative (BRI) – played 
an important role in intra-elite conflicts leading up to the 2014 coup. Taking a longue 
durée perspective, and drawing on world-systems theory, he interprets the Chinese 
mega-infrastructure projects as the material backbone of what André Gunder Frank 
(1996) called the “ReOrientation” of the world economy towards China. Against this 
background, the coup d’état in Thailand appears as an example of the upheavals in 
the phase of transition between two accumulation cycles. 
Bonn Juego’s article adds to the discussion in how far the new authoritarianism in 
Southeast Asia is new and linked to a specific new economic project (such as Chinese 
investment or the Chinese BRI). His very topical article departs from the recent his-
toric elections in Malaysia where the longtime opposition Pakatan Harapan defeated 
the Barisan Nasional, which had ruled the country since its independence in 1957. 
Yet, this likewise marked the return to power of Mahathir Mohamad, one of modern 
Asia’s notorious strongmen and leading proponent of the concept of Asian Values. 
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The new ruling government under Mahathir promises regime change through insti-
tutional reforms, the revival of populist economic policies, and the investigation of 
massive corruption allegations against the nine-year tenure of former premier Najib 
Razak – including the review of lucrative megaproject deals with China’s government 
and corporations under the BRI framework. Juego concretely discusses the insti-
tutions of the prevailing regime where the promised reforms shall start and where 
change must come. Through a critical assessment of the evolving political economy 
of development from Mahathir’s first stint as prime minister in the 1980s/1990s to 
the administrations of Abdullah Badawi and Najib at the turn of the 21st century, 
Juego reveals the continuity and progression of what he calls the regime of “authori-
tarian neoliberalism”, or a neoliberal economy embedded in authoritarian politics in 
contemporary Malaysia. 
Middleton, in his contribution, focuses directly on the nexus between economy 
and authoritarianism and discusses the dynamics of transnational business activi-
ties and human rights violations in the region. His analysis sheds light on economic 
actors from Thailand and Malaysia and on a transnational aspect of the work of 
human rights commissions in these countries. Drawing on the concept of ‘extraterri-
torial obligations’ (ETOs) – duties of states towards protecting human rights beyond 
borders (ETO Consortium 2013) – he argues that appropriately mandated National 
Human Rights Institutions and an active civil society empowered with political and 
civil freedoms are necessary for the further institutionalization and effective utiliza-
tion of ETOs in the region. He shows this dynamism on the example of two dams 
under construction on the Mekong River’s mainstream, namely the Xayaburi Dam in 
Northern Laos and the Don Sahong Dam in Southern Laos, and the role of the Thai 
and Malaysia national human rights commissions. 
The four articles in this issue focus on different aspects of the authoritarian 
regimes in Southeast Asia and their connection to economic regulation and crises. 
They illustrate facets of persistent neoliberalism, but also the contrary – the dawn of 
a new accumulation cycle of world history. They reveal transnational mechanisms 
of primitive accumulation as well as sophisticated transnational institutionalization 
processes for the defense of human rights. There is no coherent picture or answer 
to the question whether the new authoritarian regimes are connected with a spe-
cific economic project or a regional flavor. However, what becomes clear is that any 
response to the rather bleak outlook can only be transnational cooperation in the 
search for more fundamental alternatives.

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